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Voters￿ preferences depend on the available information. Follow-
ing Case-Based Decision Theory, we assume that this information is
processed additively. We prove that the collective preferences deduced
from the individual ones through majority vote cannot be arbitrary,
as soon as a winning quota is required. The proof is based on a new
result on random walks.
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11 Introduction
The purpose of this note is to point out a somewhat unexpected relation
between random walks and some aspects of voting theory. Our model is the
following. Voters￿ preferences are in￿uenced by the information that gets
available prior to the election day. This information may take the form of a
collection of facts, arguments or cases that are brought forth. We here assume
that this information is processed in an additive manner by each voter. To
be speci￿c, for each voter i, each case c and each alternative x,t h e r ei sa
number wi(x,c) that measures the support that case c lends to x:i f t h e








This class of decision procedures has been introduced into economics and
axiomatized by Gilboa and Schmeidler (2001) following some work in AI and
psychology.
Our interest lies in understanding whether these assumptions on indi-
vidual preferences can be tested at the aggregate level: does the collective
preference relation derived from individual preferences through quali￿ed ma-
jority voting exhibit any speci￿c pattern? or is it purely arbitrary? In other
2words, knowing how the population of voters reacts facing some evidence,
can we infer anything regarding its reaction to additionnal information ?
Let X be the (￿nite) set of alternatives and C the (￿nite) universe of all
possible cases, and let q ≥ 1/2 be the quota. A society π is de￿ned by a
(￿nite) set N of voters and by the vector (wi(x,c))i∈N,c∈C,x∈X of individual
preferences. Collective preferences are de￿ned using majority vote with quota
q:g i v e nas u b s e tD ⊂ C and two alternatives x and y, x (resp. y) is weakly
preferred to y (resp. to x) by society if no more than q of the voters strictly
prefers y to x (resp. x to y)g i v e nD. Thus, a given society induces a map
that associates to any non-empty subset D of C the above re￿exive binary
relation over X.
The case q =1 /2 is analysed in Gilboa and Vieille (2002). It is shown
that majority voting may be unpredictable in the sense that any such map
may be the outcome of majority voting. We here prove that this result is
speci￿ct ot h ec a s eq =1 /2 and that, for higher quotas, binary relations
arising from majority voting have some structure. Put somewhat loosely,
collective preferences between any two alternatives cannot be reversed by
adding an extra piece of information, provided much information is already
available.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 is devoted to the model and
to the statement of the result. The proof of the main result is given in Section
33, which emphasizes the connection to random walk theory and sampling.
The proof is based on a new result on random walks, the proof of which is
g i v e ni nS e c t i o n4 .
2 Model and Result
2.1 Individual and collective preferences
We let two ￿nite sets X and C be given. The set X is the set of alternatives
that are being considered. Most of the paper will focus on the case |X| =2 .
The set C is the universe of all facts (or cases, stories, etc.) that may be
(publicly) known. A population π is described by the set N of voters, together
with the individual preferences over X. Preferences of a voter i ∈ N over
X depends on the available information, that may be any non-empty subset
of C. We make the assumption that information is processed additively.
Speci￿cally, the preferences of voter i are characterized by a function wi :
X ￿C→R, with the interpretation that, given information D ⊂ C,v o t e r





A population π is described by the set N of individuals, together with the
collection (wi)i∈N of preferences.
Let P∗(C) be the set of non-empty subsets of C and R be the set of
4(complete) re￿exive binary relations over X. Let a population π =( N,(wi))
be given. Individual preferences are aggregated using majority voting with
quota q.F i xD ∈ P∗(C) and let x,y be any two alternatives. Alternative x



















Thus, π induces a map Mπ : P∗(C) → R where Mπ(D)= %π
D.
2.2 Results
The imposed structure on individual preferences implies much correlation
between the preferences of voter i given various informations. As an illus-
tration, the following holds, given two disjoints sets D1 and D2.I f v o t e r i
prefers x to y given either D1 or D2, he still prefers x to y given both D1 and
D2. Our main focus is in understanding whether any correlation still exists
at the collective level.
The following result, due to Gilboa and Vieille (2002) shows that this
correlation may entirely vanish at the aggregate level, if q = 1
2.W h e n C is
a singleton, the statement below is a slight generalization of a result due to
McGarvey (1953).
5Theorem 1 Let q =1 /2.F o re a c hM : P∗(C) → R, there exists a population
π such that Mπ = M.
Our main point is to show that Theorem 1 does not extend to q>1
2.
We limit ourselves to two alternatives x and y. This case allows for several
simpli￿cations. First, individual preferences wi : X ￿C→R are equivalently
described by wi(c): =wi(x,c) − wi(y,c),s ot h a ti prefers x to y given D if
P
c∈D wi(c) > 0. Next, an element % of R can be identi￿ed to the set of
winning alternatives, i.e. to x, to y or to {x,y} if respectively x ￿ y , y ￿ x
or neither of the two holds.
Theorem 2 Let q>1/2.L e tM : P∗(C) → R be deﬁned by M(C)=x if
|C| is even and M(C)=y if |C| is odd. If |C| is large enough, there is no
population π such that Mπ = M.
This result may be paraphrased by saying that collective preferences Mπ,
whenever anonymous, cannot be easily reversed as soon as much information
is already available. The statement may be strengthened in many respects,
as will be clear from the proof in Section 3. The present one has the merit
of simplicity.
The formula (1) need not always be the sensible way to de￿ne society￿s
preferences in the presence of quotas. In many instances, e.g. when consti-
6tutional amendments are being considered, one of the alternatives if a statu
quo while the other is the reform being considered for implementation, so
that the two alternatives do not have symmetric roles. The statu quo is
preferred to the reform iﬀ the reform fails to attract a fraction of at least q of
the voters. It is shown in Gilboa and Vieille (2002) that Theorem 1 extends
to arbitrary q ≥ 1/2 with this modi￿ed de￿nition of collective preferences.
The proof of Theorem 2 is based on an auxiliary result on random walks
that we present next. Recall that a random walk is a sequence (Sn)n of
random variables with iid one-step increments Sn+1 − Sn,n∈ N.
Proposition 3 For every ε>0,t h e r ee x i s t sN0 such that the following





P(S2m ≥ 0 >S 2m+1) <ε . (2)
We comment brie￿y on this result. Note ￿rst that no integrability condi-
tion (mean, variance) is assumed on (Sn).T h ev a l u e sN and N2 that appear
in (2) are somewhat arbitrary, what matters is that the number of terms in
the summation be small compared to the index of the ￿rst term.
We next explore the relationship of Proposition 3 to the Central Limit
Theorem. Let (Sn)n be a random walk, such that the increment Xn :=
7Sn − Sn−1 (S0 =0 ) has a variance. By de￿nition, the sequence (Xn)n≥1
is iid. Assume for convenience that E[X2
n]=1and set m := E[Xn].B y
the central limit theorem, (Sn − nm/
√
n)n converges in law to the standard
normal distribution N(0,1).
If, say, m>0, (Sn) converges in probability to +∞, hence P(Sn ≥ 0 >
Sn+1)=P(Sn ≥ 0 and Xn+1 < −Sn) converges to zero. If now m =0 , Sn,
when positive, is typically of the order
√
n.I np a r t i c u l a r ,P(Sn ≥ n1/3|Sn ≥
0) converges to one as n goes to in￿nity. Since P(Xn+1 < −n1/3) converges
to zero, P(Sn ≥ 0 and Xn+1 < −Sn) converges to zero. Thus, for each
integrable random walk, P(Sn ≥ 0 >S n+1) converges to zero as n goes to
in￿nity.
However, the convergence is not uniform, as shown by the example below.
Fix N ∈ N and let (Xn)n be an iid sequence with PN(Xn = N)= 1
N and
PN(Xn = −1) = 1 − 1
N. Plainly, the event {SN ≥ 0 >S N+1} coincides with
the event {SN =0 ,X N+1 = −1} = {XN+1 = −1,X n = N for exactly one n ∈ {1,...,N}}.
Therefore,





which converges to 1
e as N goes to in￿nity.
This example shows that P(Sn ≥ 0 >S n+1) does not converge to zero,
uniformly w.r.t. the random walk. In that respect, the statement in Propo-
8sition 3 is optimal.
2.3 An example
We here partially analyze an incomplete example, in order to illustrate why
considering large amounts of information is helpful. Let M : P∗(C) → R be
given, such that M(C)=x (resp. M(C)=y)w h e n e v e r|C| =1(resp. |C| =
2). Let π =( N,(wi)) be a (hypothesized) population such that Mπ(C)=
M(C) for |C| ≤ 2.
For C ∈ P∗(C),l e tN(C) be the set of voters i ∈ N that strictly prefer
x to y given C. Since individual preferences are additive in cases, N({c1}) ∩
N({c2}) ⊆ N({c1,c 2}).T h u s , b o t h N({c1}) and N({c2}) contain at least
q of the population while N({c1}) ∩ N({c2}) contains at most 1 − q of the
population. Thus, for each c1 6= c2, the two sets N({c1}) and N({c2}) should
be fairly diﬀerent. If C is large, this means that the set N contains many
large fairly diﬀerent subsets of voters. Speci￿cally, identify the diﬀerent
voters to mutually disjoint subintervals of length 1
|N| of [0,1].T h e n ,a l ls e t s
(N({c}))c∈C are subsets of [0,1] of length exceeding q, while the length of any
pairwise intersection does not exceed 1 − q. Despite sounding problematic,
this is feasible, provided the quota q is not too large.
Indeed, let q ∈ [1/2,3/5],a n dl e tC be ￿xed. Let the set N of voters
9be the set of functions i : C → {0,1,2,3,4}. The preferences of voter i are
given by wi(c)=1if i(c) ∈ {0,1,2} and wi(c)=−3 if i(c) ∈ {3,4}.T h e
set N({c}) coincides with the set of functions i such that i(c) ∈ {0,1,2},
hence contains 3/5 of N,w h i l e ,f o rc1 6= c2,t h es e tN({c1,c 2}) reduces to
N({c1}) ∩ N({c2}) which contains 9/25 < 2/5 of N.
Note that in this example, preferences of voters are not correlated across
cases: the preference given a set C of cases of a (randomly selected) voter
gives no information on her preferences given some case c0 / ∈ C.
The construction here relies on the idea that it is easier to reverse a voter￿s
preferences by adding a single case if little information has been accumulated
so far. A contrario, the basic insight of the proof to come is that this becomes
very diﬃcult if a substantial amount of information has been piled.
3 Votes with quota
Let ε ∈ (0,
2q−1
4 ).W el e tN0 be given by Proposition 3.
3.1 Cyclic populations and random walks
Deﬁnition 4 A population (N,w) is said to be cyclic if there is a one-to-one
function v : C → R such that given any permutation σ of C,t h e r ei sau n i q u e
10i ∈ N such that wi = v ◦ σ.
Plainly, if (N,w) is a cyclic population, then |N| = |C|! .We label cases
from 1 to |C|.L e t ι be a randomly selected voter. For n ≤ |C|,w es e t
Xn := wι(n). Plainly, the random vector (X1,...,X|C|) is a randomly ordered
list of the elements of the set v(C).
Lemma 5 Let an integer K ≥ N0 a n das e tC be given such that |C| ≥
(2K2 +2 K − 1)





P(X1 + ... + X2m ≥ 0 >X 1 + ... + X2m+1) < 2q − 1.
Proof. We rephrase the problem using the following auxiliary experiment.
Sample |C| elements c1,...,c|C| from the set C,a n dl e tYl := w1(cl) be the
weight assigned by the ￿rst voter given the lth sampled item.




when sampling is done without re-




is a random permutation of the elements
of C. Hence, the vector (Y1,...,Y|C|) is a randomly ordered list of the elements
of v(C), i.e., the law of (Y1,...,Y|C|) coincides with the law of (X1,...,X|C|).
Thus, for each m,
P(X1+...+X2m ≥ 0 >X 1+...+X2m+1)=Q(Y1+...+Y2m ≥ 0 >Y 1+...+Y2m+1)
(3)




when sampling is done with replace-






Q1(Y1 + ... + Y2m ≥ 0 >Y 1 + ... + Y2m+1) <ε .( 4 )
To conclude, we prove that the laws of (Y1,...,YN1) under the two distribu-
tions Q and Q1 are close, where N1 =2 K2 +2 K − 1.
Sampling without replacement may be viewed as sampling with replace-
ment, conditional on sampled items being all distinct:
Q((c1,...,cN1)=( c1,...,cN1)) = Q1((c1,...,cN1)=( c1,...,cN1)|ci 6= cj for each i 6= j).
For each pair (i,j) with i 6= j, Q1(ci = cj)= 1
|C|. Therefore, for any event A
that depends only upon (c1,...,cN1), one has








The result follows, by (3), (4) and (5).
123.2 Proof of Theorem 2
We now prove Theorem 2. We argue by contradiction, and let π =( N,(wi)i∈N)
be an hypothesized population such that Mπ = M. We proceed in three
steps. We ￿rst prove that wi may be assumed to be one-to-one for each
i ∈ N. Next, we enlarge the population π to obtain a population π0 that is
a disjoint union of cyclic populations. We conclude by using Lemma 5.
Step 1 For each i ∈ N,l e tw0
i : C →R be a one-to-one function such that








,w h e r et h ei n ￿mum is taken over
all C such that
P
i∈C wi 6=0 .L e tπ0 =( N,(w0
i)) be the population obtained




i(c) > 0 (resp. < 0) whenever
P
i∈C wi(c) > 0 (resp. < 0). Therefore, for each D.
x %
π
D y implies x %
π0
D y.
Thus, the two binary relations %π
D and %π0
Dcoincide for each D.W ea s s u m e
below that wi is one-to-one for each i ∈ N.
Step 2 Set N := N ￿ Σ,w h e r eΣ is the set of permutations of C.F o r
(i,σ) ∈ N,w es e tw(i,σ) := wi◦σ. In other words, the population π =( N,w)
is obtained from π by adding to each voter i ∈ N all permutations of wi.
Since M(C)=Mπ(C) depends only on |C|, one has Mπ = M.N o t e t h a t ,





Let (ι,σ) ∈ N be a randomly selected voter. For n ≤ |C|,s e tXn :=





P(X1 + ... + X2m ≥ 0 >X 1 + ... + X2m+1|ι = i) < 2q − 1. (6)





P(X1 + ... + X2m ≥ 0 >X 1 + ... + X2m+1) < 2q − 1. (7)
On the other hand, since Mπ = M,o n eh a sP(X1 + ... + X2m ≥ 0) ≥ q and
P(X1 + ... + X2m+1 < 0) ≥ q for each m,h e n c eP(X1 + ... + X2m ≥ 0 >
X1 + ... + X2m+1) ≥ 2q − 1- a contradiction to (7).
4 On random walks
Recall that a random walk is a sequence (Sn) whose increments (Sn+1−Sn)n≥0
are iid. We set Xn := Sn − Sn−1; Sn is usually seen as the position at time
n of a particle that moves from date n − 1 and n of an amount of Xn.T h e
14law of the random walk (Sn) is determined by the law of X1.
We shall use an alternative construction of the random walk. De￿ne µ+
(resp. −µ−)t ob et h el a wo fX1 conditioned on X1 ≥ 0 (resp. X1 < 0)a n d
set p = P(X1 ≥ 0),q = P(X1 < 0).L e t (Yn) (resp. (Zn)n) be a sequence
of iid variables with law µ+ and µ− respectively. Beware that both Yn and








l=1 Zl.T h e n
the sequence (Sn) can be described as follows. At time n: choose a direction
dn ∈ {−1,+1} with respective probabilities p and q; if dn =1 ,m o v eu pb y





Let κn = |{l ≤ n : dl =+ 1 }| bethe numberofupwardmovesupton. Plainly,





P(Sn ≥ 0 >S n+1)=P(Sn ≥ 0,d n+1 = −1,S n + Zn+1 < 0)

















15Lemma 6 One has P(Sn ≥ 0 >S n+1) ≤ qsupk∈{1,...,n} Ck
npkqn−k.















The conclusion will follow by integration over the possible values of (Y1,...,Yn),
using (8). Since both sequences (S
−
l ) and (S
+












































We proceed to the proof of Proposition 3. The argument goes as follows.
Let M be large, and (Sn) be a given random walk. We prove that if p
(= P(S1 ≥ 0) is of the order of 1
M, the events {S2m ≥ 0 >S 2m+1},w h e r em
16ranges over M2,...,M2 + M − 1, are approximately disjoint. If the number
of these events exceeds 1
ε, their average probability can not exceed ε.O nt h e
other hand, if p is much greater than 1
M, the probability of each of the events
{S2m ≥ 0 >S 2m+1} is close to zero, hence also the average of these. We now
provide details.








≤ α for each n,( 9 )
(α may be chosen to be small, e.g., α =2suﬃces).





π +1 ) )be given. Let (Sn)n≥0 be an
arbitrary random walk. We prove below that (2) holds.
Case 1: q ≤ ε
By Lemma 6, P(S2m ≥ 0 >S 2m+1) ≤ q for each m.H e n c et h er e s u l ti s
obvious in that case.
Case 2:M2p ≥ α3e2
ε
√
π +1and q ≥ ε.
Let an even m ≥ 2M2 be given. By Lemma 6,






m−k.( 1 0 )
17By Feller (section VI.3), the values Ck
mpkqm+1−k ￿rst increase with k then
decrease, the maximum being reached for k such that (m +1 ) p − 1 <k≤





























For the same reason,
¡ mq
m−k































where the second inequality follows by the choice of M. The result follows
by averaging over m.
Case 3:Mp≤ ε
2.
Plainly, if S2m1+1 < 0 ≤ S2m2 for some m2 >m 1,t h e ndm = −1 for some
m>m 1. Therefore,
P(S2m1+1 < 0,S 2m2 ≥ 0 for some m2 >m 1) ≤ Mp











with the family of events Am = {S2m ≥ 0 >S 2m+1} to get
M2+M−1 X
m=M2






The result follows by dividing by M.
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